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ABSTRACT
Non-profit organisations (NPOs) exist to fulfil the needs of societies that 
cannot be reached by the government and profit centres. Their ultimate 
goal is to create social values by solving social problems. In order to 
fulfil this social mission, it is vital for the NPOs to be effective. NPOs are 
associated with effective Board of Directors because they are the backbone 
for organisational success. Of late, there are growing media reports on 
mismanagement and diversion of NPOs funds. Despite having Board of 
Directors as trustees in NPOs, mismanagement is still on the rise. Previous 
findings suggest that NPOs’ board characteristics can be divided into two 
groups - (1) board characteristics that enhance NPOs’ effectiveness and 
(2) board characteristics that reduce NPOs’ effectiveness. Hence, this
study aims to examine selected board characteristics of Malaysian NPOs.
The selected board characteristics are board size, board engagement,
board efficiency, board commitment, board with political connection
and board professionalism. Using content analysis of NPOs registered
under the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), this study finds
that, in general, the number of members on the board is seven. Board
efficiency and engagement indicate that less than 50% of the members are
committed in generating funds for the NPOs. However, results on board
commitment indicate that board members are committed in managing their
organisations efficiently. In relation to politically affiliated board members
and professional affiliation, the results are 44% and 14% respectively. In
summary, the findings provide insights on the characteristics of Malaysian
NPOs’ board members in. It also provides a basis for future research in
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examining the influence of board characteristics on effectiveness as well 
as other areas of concern in NPOs. 
Keywords: non-profit organisations, board characteristics, board of 
directors, non-profit organisational effectiveness
introDuction 
Non-profit organisations (NPOs) are generally defined as societies, 
associations, charities, and other voluntary organisations that are formed for 
the purpose of contributing to society through their social value creation. 
Social values refer to specific outcomes which focus on reducing or 
eliminating unfavourable conditions in order to improve the beneficiaries’ 
economic standards of living (Kroeger & Weber, 2015; Martin & Osberg, 
2007; Westall, 2009). It is also perceived as the outcome of solving social 
problems (Kendall & Knapp, 2000). Amongst issues addressed by NPOs 
are homelessness, elderly care, youth and unemployed single mothers. In 
order to fulfil these social missions, it is crucial that NPOs deliver their 
social services effectively.
Donors and other fund providers place higher trusts on effective NPOs 
because these NPOs are expected to have higher accountability and deliver 
higher quality of social services (Ebrahim, 2003; Gill, Flynn & Reissing, 
2005; Berg & Månsson, 2011). However, this trust is violated when media 
reports on ineffective NPOs made the headlines: “Datuk among 50 quizzed 
by MACC over funds abuse in Kelantan flood victims’ home project” (New 
Straits Times, 2016); “Singapore Pastor arrested for funds for wife’s pop 
career” (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2012); “Malaysian Paralympic Council 
writes off RM3.8m in company run by its President” (The Sun Daily, 2012); 
“Probe into Suaram status” (The Star, 2012); “Islamic orphanage centre 
carried out deviant Islamic teachings” (Utusan Melayu, 2012); and “Abuse 
of Tsunami aid” (New Straits Times, 2006). These reports have raised 
concerns from the public on the role of board members in achieving their 
social mission as majority of the funds were from public donations. Most of 
these cases were associated with ineffective Board of Directors in managing 
the NPOs, such as mismanagement of funds, fraud, embezzlement and poor 
investment decisions by the NPO Board of Directors.
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Previous studies provided evidence that various forms of Board of 
Directors’ characteristics influence organisational effectiveness (Bai, 2013; 
Brown, 2005; Callen, Klein, & Tinkelman, 2003; Horváth & Spirollari, 
2012; Newton, 2015; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). For example, Olson 
(2000) found that larger board size was able to acquire more resources, 
and, hence, enhance  organisational effectiveness.  In contrast, Board of 
Directors without side director ownership (Beasley, 1996), lower board 
meeting frequency (Horváth & Spirollari, 2012), and politically connected 
board (Hasnan, Rahman & Mahenthiran, 2013), were found to reduce 
organisational effectiveness. As such, the above findings highlighted that 
Board of Directors’ characteristics can be divided into two groups: (1) board 
of directors’ characteristics that reduce organisational effectiveness and (2) 
board of directors’ characteristics that enhance organisational effectiveness.
The board characteristics in NPOs are further explained from two 
organisational theory perspectives. Firstly, managerial diversion theory 
(MDT), which provides the framework in explaining board members 
entrenchment effect. This is based on the argument that Board of Directors 
in NPOs are given less, or in some organisations, nil monetary incentives 
relative to for-profit organisations. They are more likely to divert their 
powers into personal rewards or some other benefits (Nichols, 1972, Otten 
& Heugens, 2008; Werner & Tosi, 1995). Secondly, resource dependence 
theory perspective (RDT), which proposes the positive attributes of board 
members in NPOs in promoting organisational effectiveness. In this context, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that board members’ ability to manage 
organisational resources that can secure organisational survival, can lead to 
NPOs’ effectiveness in delivering their social values. This infers that board 
member’s ability to manage NPOs’ dependency on external resources, 
such as the ability to innovate funding strategy, will enhance the NPOs’ 
competitive advantage as well as sustainable provision of social objectives 
(Jaskyte, 2012).
In this study, six selected board characteristics of Malaysian NPO 
board members were examined: Board size, board engagement, board 
efficiency, board commitment, board with political connection and board 
professionalism. Hence, the preliminary findings of the study seek to 
provide more useful insights on the characteristics of Malaysian NPO 
board members. 
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The next section of this paper outlines the nature of Malaysian NPOs. 
The literature includes board characteristics that affect organisational 
effectiveness and the theoretical concepts associated with the board 
characteristics. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of study 
findings. Conclusions drawn from the study are presented in the last section 
together with suggestions for future research.
non-profit organisations (npos) in malaysia
NPOs consist of societies, associations and voluntary organisations formed 
to fulfil public goods demand (Young, 2009). NPOs are also referred to as 
the third sector organisations, i.e. after public sector and private sector, due 
to their importance in (1) fulfilling the needs of society, which cannot be 
satisfied by government organisations and (2) its relevant contribution to the 
economic growth of the country. For instance, in 2007, the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of NPOs in Canada made a significant contribution of 7% 
to total Canadian economy. Another study, by the Centre for Civil Society 
Studies, revealed that, in 2013, the NPOs in Westchester County, New York, 
offered the highest job employment as compared to other profit sectors, 
such as construction, finance and wholesale trade industries, combined.
In Malaysia, there are two main regulatory bodies governing the NPOs, 
namely the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) and the Registry of 
Societies (ROS). NPOs that are registered under the CCM are incorporated 
under the Companies Act 1965 as a company limited by guarantee (CLBG) 
for which all financial statements must be audited, while NPOs registered 
under ROS are regulated under the Societies Act 1966 and their financial 
statements are not subject to audit. However, audit is highly encouraged 
and usually done by the NPOs on a voluntary basis. Since CLBGs are not 
subjected to contribution of the share capital, NPOs are obliged to derive 
their donations or any form of revenue of RM 1 million within six months 
from the date of incorporation. 
The main goal of all the registered NPOs, either under CCM or ROS, 
is not for profit maximisation but the noble intention of providing social 
services. NPOs play a major role in assisting the government in providing 
social services in many areas, such as the environment, humanitarian 
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aid, animal protection, education, the arts, social issues, charities, early 
childhood education, healthcare, politics, religion, research and sports (Ow, 
2008). Their main source of revenue is from public donations and thus, 
“the generosity of the donors determines the survival of the NPOs” (Atan 
& Zainon, 2009). Therefore, high levels of public trust and confidence is a 
matter of concern in NPOs. According to the National Council for Voluntary 
Organizations (NCVO) (1996), public trust and confidence are important 
to (1) ensure public goodwill and maintain or increase support in the form 
of money and time donations, (2) promote voluntary association and build 
social citizenship, and (3) develop and maintain the political space in which 
to operate. Hence, in order to gain public trust and confidence, NPOs are 
required to be effective because donors and other stakeholders are drawn 
towards effective NPOs.  
literature revieW
Board Characteristics and Non-Profit Organisational 
effectiveness
Prior empirical findings suggested that the board can either influence 
the effectiveness of NPOs or reduce the effectiveness of NPOs (Aggarwal, 
Evans, & Nanda 2011; Bradshaw & Hayday, 1998; Callen, Klein, & 
Tinkelman, 2009; Preston & Brown, 2004). For example, according to 
Olson (2000), a larger board size promotes board diversity, which, in turn, 
leads to effective monitoring due to lesser managerial influence (Olson, 
2000). Additionally, Pfeffer (1972) mentioned that a larger board size has 
more control over the external environment and is more able to attract more 
resources, and, hence, is seen to be capable of increasing organisational 
effectiveness. This is consistent with the resource dependence theory 
(RDT) by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), which highlights that boards manage 
to secure resources, and, therefore, have the capability to enhance NPO 
effectiveness. On the other hand, politically connected board is expected 
to reduce NPO effectiveness. Due to their reputation, politically connected 
board members feel that should not be seen as failures (Kassem & Higson, 
2012), and, therefore, are more likely to be involved in unfavourable 
activities such as cronyism and lobbying (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 
2004; Yu & Yu, 2012). Therefore, the RDT perspective proposes that board 
characteristics motivate organisational effectiveness in NPOs.   
132
malaysian accounting review, volume 15 no. 2, 2016
Managerial Diversion Theory and Non-Profit Organisational 
effectiveness
Viewed from related literature, managerial diversion exists in several 
forms such as self-dealing, sell assets to the firm at a higher price or buy 
assets from the firm at a lower price (non-arms length price), insider trading, 
embezzlement, high salaries and bonuses to the directors. Likewise, the 
diversion can also be in the form of facilities and services such as enchanting 
furnishing, beautiful secretaries, company owned motor vehicle, nepotism 
(board members are among siblings, relatives or favourable persons) and 
luxurious and expensive vacations and large expenditure transactions 
(Bebchuk & Jolls, 1999; Nichols, 1967; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Apart 
from these, Nichols (1967) also stressed that another way of diversion is 
when Board of Directors may divert the funds to other businesses owned 
by them. For instance, the report on Malaysian Paralympic (The Sun Daily, 
2012) and the Singapore Pastor who used the charity funds to finance his 
wife’s singing career (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2012).
Another form of managerial diversion is using ‘spacemen’ (Mironov, 
2013). According to Mironov (2013), spaceman is a third party to whom 
the managers channelled the organisational fund for their fake services 
given. In Mironov’s research, the spacemen were found to be the names 
of homeless people, or individuals who have lost their identification 
cards or individuals who sold their identification details. Therefore, the 
board will transfer business fund which looked like genuine payments 
to these spacemen. However, the study cannot determine as to whether 
the fund to the spacemen is returned to the board or for the spacemen’s 
own consumption. These forms of diversions lead organisations to be less 
effective (Rasmusen, 1988) because uncontrolled managerial diversions 
of for-profit organisations would lead to the decrease in the organisations’ 
profits and shareholders’ value (Hovakimian, Li &  Li, 2013). In the context 
of NPOs, managerial diversion would result in lesser or nil amount of the 
organisations’ resources to create social values. For example, Kids Wish 
Network was declared as the worst American charity because for every one 
dollar of donation received, only three cents were given to charity whilst 97 
cents were diverted to paying the solicitors. Therefore, with the existence 
of the diversion, organisations will become less effective and, as a result, 
fail to achieve their noble mission of servicing the society. Sadly, based on 
media reports, most of the diversions were committed by the board members. 
133
EffEctivEnEss, AccountAbility And undErstAnding boArd
Resource Dependence Theory and Non-Profit Organisational 
effectiveness
Effective boards are able to enhance their potential to attract scarce 
resources to the NPOs. Following this, earlier findings suggested that the 
resource dependence theory (RDT) is more applicable to the governance 
of NPOs because this theory explains how these external resources are able 
to influence the behaviour of board members (Mwenja & Lewis, 2009). 
According to the RDT (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), the focus concerns on 
how the external environment can influence the survival of an organisation. 
Organisations depend on the external environment in acquiring and 
maintaining their resources, enhancing the NPO governance process, 
and building and creating a good public image in fulfilling their social 
obligations (Miller-Millesen, 2003).  However, this external environmental 
dependency is high with uncertainties and may jeopardize the survival 
of the firm. Therefore, this theory contends that an effective board can 
recognise and modify this dependency on the external environment so that 
the organisation is able to carry out its mission effectively. The role of the 
board is to adapt the dependency of the NPO on the external environment 
which is also perceived as the ability to enhance NPO efficiency. Hence, the 
perspective of this theory is appropriate in explaining the behaviour of the 
board in NPOs due to the reliance nature of NPOs on external events i.e. 
in sustaining their financial strength. For example, NPOs rely on external 
events to generate their resources, such as grants from government, private 
donations from corporations or individual donations. 
The RDT is also used by researchers in explaining the role of the board 
in relation to financial vulnerabilities (Trussel, 2002), predicting bankruptcy 
(Gales & Kesner, 1994), examining compliance with accounting standards, 
disclosure of information (Verbruggen, Hubrussel, Ugent, & Hubrussel, 
2011) and evaluating performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). According 
to Zahra and LaTour (1987), there are four perspectives that can be used 
to explain the role of the board: (1) legalistic, (2) resource dependence, 
(3) class hegemony, and (4) agency theory. Among the four perspectives,
resource dependence obtained strong empirical support by researchers.
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methoDology
sample and Data collection
The sample consisted of 219 NPOs registered with CCM and had 
total assets of at least RM500,000 for the financial year 2011. The findings 
in this study were derived via content analysis of annual reports and 
Financial Information Forms. Annual reports contain information on board 
of directors, financial information and the organisational activities whilst 
the financial information form reports on the details of the  organisational 
expenditure. 
board characteristics and organisational effectiveness
There were six selected board characteristics examined in this study, 
namely board size, board engagement, board efficiency, board commitment, 
board with political connection and board professionalism.
board size 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) highlights the ability of 
board members to generate their important resources (Pfeffer, 1972) for 
organisational survival. Board size can be argued from the RDT perspective 
as it is a significant variable in controlling external environment (Considine, 
O’Sullivan & Nguyen, 2014; Davis & Cobb, 2010; Hillman, Withers, & 
Collins, 2009; Kabongo, Chang, & Li, 2013; Pfeffer, 1972; Verbruggen, 
Hubrussel, Ugent & Hubrussel, 2011). The concept of bringing pertinent 
resources into the organisation is relevant in determining the success 
of organisational effectiveness (Brown, 2005; Considine, O’Sullivan & 
Nguyen, 2014). 
Larger board members with necessary expertise and capabilities are 
found to have the ability to induce more resources into the organisation 
(Aggarwal, Evans, & Nanda, 2011; Jensen, 1993; Harris, Petrovits, & 
Yetman, 2014; Pfeffer, 1972). Due to its ability to generate more resources, 
the advantages of having large board size are the ability to provide advances 
to finance their fixed operational costs (Aggarwal, Evans, & Nanda, 2011), 
likelihood to be independent and, therefore, can provide oversights by board 
members (Olson, 2000); making difficult financial decision-making (Zahra 
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& Pearce, 1989), tendency to have a more structured job descriptions that 
fosters effective board practices (Brown, 2005) and being better fundraisers 
(Harris, Petrovits, & Yetman, 2014). Although the advantages of larger 
board size are significant, it is difficult to coordinate larger board and hence, 
communication problems exist (Harris, Petrovits, & Yetman, 2014; Beasley, 
1996). Thus, the board size was examined as a proxy of board characteristics 
in this study and was represented by the number of directors on the board 
(Andrés-Alonso, Azofra-Palenzuela & Romero-Merino, 2009). 
board engagement
The board of NPOs may engage in a variety of roles, such as in 
fundraising programmes, financial oversight, evaluating the CEO, planning 
and monitoring programmes, set organisational policies, and monitoring 
board performance. Furthermore, previous literature identified fundraising as 
an important element to attract more resources into the organisation (Callen, 
Klein & Tinkelman, 2003) and thus to promote organisational effectiveness. 
Without enough resources, NPOs cannot fulfil its mission and vision. 
Hence, board members need to be successfully engaged in the fundraising 
programmes to ensure sufficient resources are acquired. However, according 
to Ostrower (2014), only one third of the board took part in fundraising 
activities. This is due to lack of awareness among the board members on 
the importance of fundraising (Scaife, Williamson, & McDonald, 2013). 
In order to measure the board engagement in terms of fundraising roles, it 
is represented by programme expenses divided by total expenses (Epstein 
& McFarlan, 2011). The efficiency of the board in fundraising roles can be 
detected if the programme expenses are less than other expenses.
Board Efficiency
Board competencies are generally associated with the human 
capital attributes possessed by the board members such as commitment, 
knowledge, skills, motivation and loyalty. These various attributes were 
evidenced to positively influence human capital efficiency in various 
forms of organisational strategies, i.e. the efficiency of the organisation; 
the value creation of the organisation; and the competitive advantage as 
well as performance (e.g. Barney, 1991; O’Donnell, 2009). This implies 
that board members can enhance their ability to take advantage of market 
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opportunities as well as to reduce potential threats effect. Similar to a 
study done by Holland and Jackson (1998), board efficiency in this study 
is measured by dividing the total revenue with the number of Board of 
Directors in the organisation. 
board commitment
NPOs are susceptible to various negative events such as embezzlements, 
mismanagement and diversions because their survival is based on public 
trust and compassion (Anne & Minogue, 2009). As such, a high level 
of accountability by the Board Of Directors is highly demanded. Bell 
(1993) suggested that board commitment is one of the important criteria 
to enhance accountability. The review of the board commitment literature 
found that board commitment is strongly associated with effective board 
(Axelrod, Gale, & Nason, 1990; Axelrod, 1994; Bell, 1993; Bright, 2001; 
Chait, Holland, & Taylor, 1996; Duca, 1996) and board effectiveness is the 
source of organisational effectiveness (Jackson & Holland, 1998). Preston 
and Brown (2004) posited that, in NPOs, board members’ emotional 
commitment is positively related to organisational performance. Programme 
support or charitable commitment can be measured using the percentage of 
total expenses spent directly for the charitable purposes to total revenue in 
order to fit this study (Epstein & McFarland, 2011). Evidence of committed 
board in the organisations can be identified when the expenses are less than 
the revenue obtained as they were committed in focusing on the community 
needs and interests.
board with political connection
Political connected board refers to Board of Directors who are 
directly involved in politics or have other political connections and possess 
monopoly power or externalities (Shleifer, 1998). Politically connected 
board is seen to be able to enhance  organisational value because they 
can attract more donations into the organisation (Goldman, Rocholl, & 
So, 2009) and can influence stock prices (Claessenset, Feijen & Leaven, 
2006; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009). However, most of the studies on 
politically connected board provide unfavourable findings. Based on the 
earlier findings, politically connected board were found to be involved in 
lobbying and cronyism as a favour of bribes, nepotism and political support 
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and, therefore, they exploited their controls over regulations (Bushman, 
Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Yu & Yu, 2012). This is due to the reputation 
or status that the politically connected board holds and that the board is 
unable to appear as a failure (Kassem & Higson, 2012). Another example 
from Chen, Fan, and Wong, (2004) is that most of the non-performing 
organisations were managed by politically connected board as they preferred 
to engage in earnings management. 
Helmig, Ingerfurth, and Pinzl, (2014) argued that in spite of proven 
as being ineffective and failed to accomplish the social mission, NPOs with 
politically connected board will still survive. This is because organisations, 
which consist of political connection board, are perceived as favourable 
organisations by the respective government and usually receive government 
assistance during financial crisis (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; 
Gul, 2006). Therefore, in order to get the assistance or support, politically 
connected board would be involved in corporate lobbying strategy (Yu & 
Yu, 2012). As a result, organisations that are managed by politically board 
members incur higher expenditure due to higher costs of lobbying and, 
subsequently, suffer higher level of debts (Chiu & Joh, 2004; Cull & Xu, 
2005; Johnson & Mitton, 2003).
In this study, a board member is defined as being politically connected 
if he used the title of Tun, Dato’ Sri, Puan Sri, Dato’, Datin, Datuk, etc. 
The measurement used for boards with political connection in this study 
of NPOs is using the percentage of the Political Board Of Directors over 
the total number of directors. This method is similar to a study by Callen, 
Klein, and Tinkelman, (2003) where the background of the board members 
was collected from annual reports and analyzed into several categories 
including well-known individuals. 
board professionalism
Professionalism is defined as ‘behaviours, aims or traits that typify a 
profession or a professional person” (Aramesh, Mohebbi, Jessri, & Sanagou, 
2009). Board with professional background is anticipated to contribute new 
ideas, enhance creativity in problem solving and has a broad knowledge in 
a specific area (Hwang & Powell, 2004). In line with RDT perspective, a 
board with this profile would be able to generate its own resources without 
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external dependency (Pfeffer, 1972). Additionally, professional board status 
has greater access to control over  organisational information (Kramer, 
1985) and this leads to better board governance practices that can influence 
organisational effectiveness (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).
Board with professional members are able to contribute on strategic 
directions of the NPOs that are pertinent to creating social values (Mwenja 
& Lewis, 2009), provide competitive advantage (Considine, O’Sullivan, & 
Nguyen, 2014), and has the ability to enhance stakeholders’ values (Garratt, 
2003). As such, professionalism is derived from professional background 
of board members who possessed professional affiliation. The total number 
of board with professional background will be divided by the total number 
of members on the board. The definition and measurement of the selected 
board characteristics as highlighted earlier is summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Definition and Measurement of Board Characteristics
board 
characteristics measurement references
Board Size Total number of board of 
directors.
Andrés-Alonso, Azofra-
Palenzuela and Romero-
Merino (2009); Brown 
(2005); Considine, 
O’Sullivan and Nguyen 
(2014); Harris, Petrovits and 
Yetman (2014)
Board 
Engagement
Programme expenses divided 
by total expenses
Epstein & McFarlan (2011)
Board Efficiency Total revenue to total number 
of board members
Barney (1991); O’Donnell 
(2009)
Board 
commitment
Percentage of total expenses 
directly incurred for the 
charitable purposes to total 
revenue
Epstein & McFarlan (2011)
Board with 
political 
connection
Percentage of board members 
with political connections 
to total number of board 
members.
Hasnan, Rahman and 
Mahenthiran (2013); Helmig 
(2014)
Board 
professionalism
Percentage of board of 
directors with professional 
affiliations to total number of 
board of directors.
Considine, O’Sullivan and 
Nguyen (2014);  Mwenja 
and Lewis (2009)
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finDings
The data reported in Table 2 highlights the findings based on descriptive 
statistics of the selected board characteristics. 
table 2: Descriptive statistics of selected board characteristics
min maximum mean std Deviation
Board Size 2.00 50.00 7.2714 6.0474
Board Engagement 0.00 1.00 0.4512 0.38254
Board Efficiency (RM) 0.00 35,116,392.40 7.11194.48 2.650027.94
Board commitment 0.00 1.00 0.6667 0.4724
Board with political 
connection 0.00 1.00 0.4429 0.3610
Board professionalism 0.00 0.83 0.1438 0.1969
From Table 2, the value of mean for board size was found to be 7.2714 
which indicates that the board size ranged from a minimum of 2.00 to a 
maximum of 50.00 with an average of 7 persons. The mean value of 7 is 
considered as fairly small board size but past literature suggested that it is 
preferable in order to enhance organisational effectiveness (Andrés-Alonso, 
Azofra-Palenzuela, & Romero-Merino, 2009; Brown, 2005; Considine, 
O’Sullivan, & Nguyen, 2014; Harris, Potrovits, & Yetman, 2014). For 
instance, large board may have communication problem among the board 
members and in turn reduce timely decision-making process.  
The descriptive statistics on board engagement found that the mean is 
45.12 per cent (%), from the range of 0.00 to 1.00. It infers that most NPOs 
had used fundraising to meet the stakeholders’ need and interests. However, 
it is relatively low and can be associated with lack of awareness among the 
board members on the importance of fundraising (Scaife, Williamson, & 
McDonald, 2013). The recognition and promotion to be more financially 
independent by the NPOs in Malaysia has recently began in mitigating the 
current diminishing unrestricted funding coupled with increasing demand 
for social services.   
Board efficiency’s mean value of RM7.11194.48, ranges from 
RM0.00 to RM36,116,392.40. The mean value of board with leader 
support and commitment is 0.6667 with a minimum value of 0.00 to 
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maximum value of 1.00. These results indicate that the board members 
have the capability in enhancing organisational effectiveness. It is 
expected that with the right promotion and capability building by the 
relevant authorities in Malaysia, the non-profit sector can play a more 
significant role in enhancing the socio-economic development of the 
nation.   
Finally, Table 2 reported that mean value of board with political 
connections is 0.4429 with minimum score of 0.00 to maximum score 
of 1.00. The mean value of board with professional affiliation is 0.1444 
with minimum value of 0.00 to maximum value of 0.83. Overall, 
the findings indicated that some NPOs have 100% board members 
with political connection whilst others have 100% board with leader 
support and commitment. The results also highlighted that some of the 
NPOs have 83% board members with professional affiliation. These 
board characteristics are valuable to the NPOs. Through their strategic 
networking politically and/or professionally, they will be more able 
to manage the external environment affecting their organisations. For 
example, politically connected boards are perceived as more favourable 
organisations by the respective government and usually receive government 
assistance during financial crisis (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; 
Gul 2006). 
conclusion
Effective organisations are highly associated with effective board 
members. Hence, the main objective of this study is to examine selected 
board characteristics of Malaysian NPOs that influence organisational 
effectiveness. Drawing from past studies, Board of Directors’ characteristics 
can result in positive or negative influence on organisational effectiveness. 
Hence Board of Directors’ characteristics can be divided into two categories 
(1) Board of Directors that can enhance organisational effectiveness and (2)
Board of Directors that can reduce organisational effectiveness. Managerial
diversion theory (MDT) suggests that the board has diverted their main
intention of creating social values into personal gain and therefore this will
reduce organisational effectiveness. In contrast, resource dependence theory
(RDT) argues that board is able to enhance organisational effectiveness
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because they can bring in more resources into the organisation since they 
have control over external resources. This study provides preliminary 
findings on selected board characteristics that influence organisational 
effectiveness. Six types of selected board characteristics were examined in 
this study, based on the sample size of 219 NPOs that are registered under 
CCM and ROS. The study found that the average number of board members 
is seven. While other board characteristics, such as board efficiency and 
engagement, are reported as less than 50% of board members being involved 
in generating funds for NPOs. Nevertheless, the findings indicated that 
board members in NPOs are committed in managing their organisations 
effectively. Additionally, the results found that 44% of the board members 
are politically connected whilst only 14% of the total board members have 
professional affiliations. Overall, the findings indicate that board members 
of Malaysian NPOs can potentially add value to organisational effectiveness 
and in turn relevant social impact to the beneficiaries. 
The findings on this study provide valuable insights on the board 
characteristics of NPOs in Malaysia. However, this study focused only 
on preliminary findings. Therefore, there is a need to examine other board 
characteristics such as board tenure, experience and gender in future 
research. In addition, future studies should incorporate other research 
methods such as interviews and in depth case studies that may contribute 
to a more meaningful analysis of board characteristics and organisational 
effectiveness. 
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